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Deweyan democracy is inherently comprehensive in the Rawlsian sense and therefore 
unable to countenance the fact of reasonable pluralism. This renders Deweyan democracy 
nonviable on pragmatic grounds. Given the Deweyan pragmatists’ views about the proper 
relation between philosophy and politics, unless there is a viable pragmatist alternative to 
Deweyan democracy, pragmatism itself is jeopardized. I develop a pragmatist alternative 
to Deweyan democracy rooted in a Peircean social epistemology. Peircean democracy can 
give Deweyan pragmatists all they should want from a democratic theory while avoiding 
the anti-pluralistic implications of Dewey’s own democratic theory. After presenting the 
arguments against Deweyan democracy and for Peircean democracy, I address a criticism 





Pragmatism has been a hotly contested term since its introduction into the 
vernacular of professional philosophy by William James in an 1898 essay 
titled “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.” He used it there to 
name an idea espoused twenty years earlier by Charles Sanders Peirce. After 
praising Peirce’s idea- the “pragmatic maxim”- James quickly confesses that 
he “thinks the principle should be expressed more broadly than Mr. Peirce 
expresses it.” And ever since then, pragmatists have been in the business of 
trying to reach agreement about what pragmatism is. 
Although I take myself to be some kind of pragmatist, I do not plan here to 
join this particular fight. I take it to be non-controversial to say that 
pragmatism is a philosophical program which insists upon assessing our 
“philosophical conceptions” by reference to their “practical results.” I realize 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was given at the College of Wooster as the 2009 Phi Sigma 
Tau Lecture. I thank Lee McBride and the Wooster philosophy department for the 
invitation and hospitality. A different version was presented in 2009 at the University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock. I thank Micah Hester and the Little Rock philosophy department 
for the invitation and hospitality. This paper draws upon, but extends, the argument of my 
A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (Talisse 2007). 
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that this formulation is likely to gain widespread assent precisely because it is 
nearly vacuous. But at least since Dewey, pragmatism has been associated 
with one particular way of cashing out that nearly vacuous commitment; the 
claim is that philosophy, when properly done, involves an ineliminable social 
and political dimension, which, when properly understood, is intrinsically 
democratic. Hilary Putnam expresses the pragmatist position when he claims 
that democracy is the “precondition for the full application of intelligence to 
the solution of social problems” (1992: 180). 
According to the pragmatist, then, there is an internal connection between 
proper philosophy and democratic politics. I take it that this is a familiar 
enough pragmatist motif to not require extended support. But it does occasion 
a serious worry: If it turns out that pragmatism cannot formulate a viable 
democratic theory, then pragmatism as a philosophical program is 
jeopardized. I shall argue in this paper that, indeed, the dominant mode of 
pragmatist philosophy yields a democratic theory that is cannot succeed in 
practice. More specifically, I shall argue that, despite the renewed interest in 
Deweyan democracy among pragmatists and political theorists more 
generally, the democratic theory arising out of Deweyan pragmatism is 
nonviable.2 For the pragmatist, this must constitute a serious indictment of 
Deweyan pragmatism. Unless there is an alternative pragmatist option that 
yields a viable democratic theory, pragmatism as such might have to be 
abandoned. Luckily for the pragmatist, there is such an alternative. I shall 
argue that there is a viable conception of democracy that arises out of Peirce’s 
pragmatism, or, to be more precise, Peirce’s pragmatist social epistemology. 
Now, it is my view that this Peircean option in democratic theory is the 
strongest conception of democracy available to contemporary political 
philosophers, but I cannot argue for this ambitious thesis here. Instead, I shall 
try only to sketch the basic contours of a Peircean democracy; in fact, I shall 
try to sketch the view in a way that does not presuppose any deep sympathy 
for Peircean pragmatism.3 My aim of course is not to lay out the Peircean 
view in a comprehensive way, but only to point a direction in which 
                                                 
2 Dewey’s political theory continues to draw a good deal of attention from pragmatist 
philosophers; see, for example recent books by Rogers (2009), Westbrook (2005) and 
Pappas (2008). It is difficult to pick up a work of mainstream contemporary democratic 
theory that does not make at least a passing positive reference to Dewey. See, for example, 
Nussbaum 2007; Bohman 2007; Dworkin 2006; Sandel 2005; Stout 2004; MacGilvray 2004; 
Richardson 2002; Sunstein 2001; Shapiro 2001; Young 2000. 
3 A fuller presentation of the view that presupposes no sympathies with Peirce or 
pragmatist at all can be found in Talisse 2009.  
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pragmatist political theory can develop, in light of the failure of Deweyan 
democracy. 
My main argument proceeds in four steps. First I sketch the basic contours 
of Deweyan democracy. Then I argue that later Rawlsian insights concerning 
the fact of reasonable pluralism render the Deweyan model of democracy 
unacceptable as an ideal for contemporary democratic societies. Third, I 
sketch a view of democracy based in Peirce’s social epistemology and argue 
that it embodies many of the attractive features of Deweyan democracy 
without inviting the later Rawlsian objections which undermine the Deweyan 




1. What Deweyan Democracy Is 
 
The core of Deweyan democracy can be stated as follows. Deweyan democracy 
is substantive rather than proceduralist, communicative rather than 
aggregative, and deep rather than statist. I shall take these contrasts in order. 
Deweyan democracy is substantive insofar as it rejects any attempt to separate 
politics and deeper normative concerns. More precisely, Dewey held that the 
democratic political order is essentially a moral order, and, further, he held 
that democratic participation is an essential constituent of the good life and a 
necessary constituent for a “truly human way of living” (LW11: 218).4 Of 
course, democratic theorists differ over the question of what democratic 
participation consists in. Dewey rejects the idea that it consists simply in 
processes of voting, campaigning, canvassing, lobbying, and petitioning in 
service of one’s individual preferences; that is, Dewey held democratic 
participation is essentially communicative, it consists in the willingness of 
citizens to engage in activity by which they may “convince and be convinced 
by reason” (MW10: 404) and come to realize “values prized in common” 
(LW13:71).5 Importantly, Dewey thought that such communicative processes 
                                                 
4 References to Dewey’s work will be keyed the Collected Works, which are divided into 
Early, Middle, and Later works. Citations employ the standard formula: (Volume number: 
page number); hence “(LW11: 218)” indicates Later Works volume 11, page 218. On the 
necessity of democratic participation, compare Campbell, “Participation in a community is 
essential to a fulfilled human existence because such participation makes possible a more 
diversified and enriching experience for all members” (1998: 24). See also Campbell 2005 
and Saito 2006. 
5 According to Dewey, the “heart and guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of 
neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of 
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were fit to direct not simply the basic structure of government, but the whole 
of social association. In fact, Dewey held famously that democracy is a “way 
of life” (LW13: 155) rather than a kind of state or a collection of political 
institutions (LW2:325). On Dewey’s view, democracy is a mode of social 
organization that “must affect all modes of human association, the family, the 
school, industry, religion” (LW2:325). In this way, Deweyan democracy is 
deep. It is meant to reach into and affect the whole of our lives, both 
individual and collective; it provides a social ideal of human flourishing or the 
good life, what Dewey called “growth” (MW12: 181). 
Deweyan democracy is therefore a species of perfectionism. As he sees the 
self as inherently social, and the good as a matter of self-realization, Dewey 
held that “Democracy and the one, ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity are . . . 
synonyms” (EW1:248).6 However, unlike other forms of perfectionism, which 
hold that the project of forming citizens’ dispositions is a task only or 
primarily for the state, Dewey’s perfectionism is, like his conception of 
democracy, deep; that is, on the Deweyan view, the perfectionist project of 
realizing human flourishing is a task for all modes of social association 
(LW2:325). Consequently, Dewey held that “The struggle for democracy has 
to be maintained on as many fronts as culture has aspects: political, economic, 
international, educational, scientific and artistic, and religious” (LW13: 186). 
He saw the task of democracy to be that of “making our own politics, 
industry, education, our culture generally, a servant and an evolving 
manifestation of democratic ideals” (LW13: 197). For Dewey, then, all social 
associations should be aimed at the realization of his distinctive vision of 
human flourishing.  
 
 
2. An Objection to Deweyan Democracy 
 
John Rawls’s conception of the “fact of reasonable pluralism” (1996: 36) is at 
this point so well known among political theorists that it does not require 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the day” (LW14:227).  
 
6 On the social self, Dewey holds that “The idea that individuals are born separate and 
isolated and are brought into society only through some artificial device is a pure myth”; 
he continues, “No one is born except in dependence on others . . . . The human being is an 
individual because of and in relation to others” (LW7:227). Dewey also holds that “society 
and individuals are correlative, organic, to one another” (MW12:187). Contemporary 
Deweyan democrats maintain this commitment; see Boisvert 1998, 54f.; Green 1999, 6; 
Stuhr 1998, 85; Fesmire 2003, 11; and Colapietro 2006, 25. 
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extended comment. Basically the idea is this: There is no single comprehensive 
philosophical, religious, or moral doctrine upon which reason, even at its best, 
converges. That is to say, there is a set of defensible and reasonable 
comprehensive moral ideals such that each ideal is fully consistent with the 
best exercise of reason but inconsistent with other members of the set. 
Consequently, despite “our conscious attempt to reason with each other” 
(1996: 55), agreement at the level of fundamental moral, religious and 
philosophical issues is elusive. Importantly, Rawls contends that reasonable 
pluralism “is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away” (1996: 
36), but “the long-run outcome of the work of human reason under enduring 
free institutions” (1996: 129). The very liberties secured in a constitutional 
democracy give rise to reasonable pluralism. 
The fact of reasonable pluralism entails the corresponding “fact of 
oppression” (1996: 36). If reasonable pluralism is “the inevitable outcome of 
free human reason,” then “a continuing shared understanding on one 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained 
only by the oppressive use of state power” (1996: 36). To simplify: Where 
minds are free, pluralism prevails; where pluralism does not prevail, minds are 
not free.  
When the facts of reasonable pluralism and oppression are considered in 
light of the core democratic commitment- which we shall call the Legitimacy 
Principle- that the exercise of coercive political power is legitimate only if it is 
justifiable, at least in principle, “to every last individual” (Waldron 1993: 37), 
the result is that that any political order which is premised upon the truth of a 
single comprehensive doctrine- even a perfectly reasonable and democratic 
one- is oppressive. It is oppressive because it coerces reasonable citizens in the 
service of a comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious ideal that they 
could reasonably reject. Accordingly, Rawls draws the radical conclusion that 
“no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a 
constitutional regime” (1996: 135). Therefore, if by “community” we mean “a 
special kind of association, one united by a comprehensive doctrine,” a “well-
ordered democratic society” cannot be a community, (1996: 40). 
However, it is clear that Deweyan democracy is committed to the claim 
that proper democracy is a community in precisely this Rawlsian sense. That 
is, Deweyan democrats envision a political world in which “all modes of 
human association” (LW2:325) are organized around Dewey’s comprehensive 
moral doctrine. As Dewey’s comprehensive doctrine is a species of 
perfectionism, he naturally sees democracy as an ongoing, and never 
completed, project of cooperatively and experimentally realizing his view of 
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human flourishing.7 Accordingly, Deweyan democrats see proper democracy 
as a matter not simply of how a society or group makes its collective decisions, 
but rather of what it decides. The Deweyan thought is that, in a proper 
democracy, collective decision should increasingly reflect a social commitment 
to principles, policies, and institutions that further Deweyan growth; 
consequently, the degree to which a given society is not directed towards the 
realization of Deweyan flourishing is the degree to which that society is failing 
at democracy. 
This point deserves emphasis. To repeat: The Deweyan view is that human 
association of any kind is properly- that is, democratically- organized only 
when it are directed towards the realization of “growth” as understood by 
Dewey. Accordingly, any association that seems to not be so directed is failing 
at democracy. Consequently, whether a given mode of social association is 
democratic is, according to the Deweyan, a matter of what policies it enacts 
rather than how it makes its collective decisions. This perhaps explains why the 
literature on Deweyan democracy is so laden with thick institutional and 
personal prescriptions concerning what democracy must be or strive to 
become.8 Curiously, many of these prescriptions are presented in the form of 
commands. We are told that if democracy is to have a future at all, we must 
become more Deweyan, and that real democracy must be devoted to realizing 
Deweyan aims, and so on. 
The problem with all of this is that the commitments constitutive of the 
Deweyan democratic ideal can be reasonably rejected. Insofar as the Deweyan 
                                                 
7 Dewey describes human flourishing as a condition in which each individual “feels [the 
community’s] success as his success, and its failure as his failure” (MW9:18). 
8 An exhaustive examination of the Deweyan democracy literature cannot be attempted 
here, so I will limit myself to only a few sources. Describing Deweyan democracy as “the 
culture of a whole society in which experience is engaged in its power of fulfillment of life 
through cooperation and communication,” Thomas Alexander claims that “if democracy is 
to have a future, it must embrace an understanding of the deepest needs of human beings 
and the means of fulfilling them” (1998: 17, my emphasis). John Stuhr claims that 
Deweyan democracy presents a “demand” for “different personal conduct and far-reaching 
cultural reconstruction- deep changes in habits of thought and action, patterns of 
association and interaction, and personal and public values” (2003: 55). He concludes that 
“we must each seek to expand democracy . . . . We must realize in thought and action that 
democracy is a personal way of individual life . . . , and we must rededicate our lives to its 
realization- now” (2003: 64). Finally, James Goulinlock describes Deweyan democracy as a 
“more or less specific ordering of personal dispositions and modes of conduct that would be 
operative in all forms of interpersonal experience”; he continues that “Political democracy, 
when it is real, is but an instance of this more generic form of life” (1999: 235; my emphasis). 
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democrat seeks to reconstruct the whole of society in the image of her own 
philosophical commitments, she seeks to create social and political institutions 
that are explicitly designed to cultivate norms and realize civic ideals that her 
fellow citizens could (and in fact do) reasonably reject. Hence Deweyan 
democracy is an ideal that must deny the fact of reasonable pluralism; it must 
deny that non-Deweyans could be reasonable. For this reason Deweyan 
democracy is oppressive in Rawls’s sense. Accordingly, Deweyan democracy is 
an inappropriate ideal for contemporary democratic societies. 
In response, Deweyans might appeal to the hackneyed injunction to 
dismiss “problems of philosophers” and attend only to the “problems of men” 
(MW10: 46); they will claim that the concept of reasonable pluralism is an 
artifice of a philosophical approach that is not properly attuned to real-life 
conditions, and conclude from this that the objection I have raised cuts no ice.  
But the fact of reasonable pluralism is a markedly evident aspect of 
modern life. One finds in newspapers and magazines, on television programs, 
on blogs and list-servs, and in the public square proponents of reasonable 
moral and political views that differ fundamentally from, and are opposed to, 
the commitments that are presupposed by Deweyan democracy. Moreover, all 
of the most pressing moral and political controversies of the day feature a 
plurality of reasonable positions formulated in terms of a wide variety of 
reasonable moral doctrines. With regard to any persistent moral dilemma, one 
can find compelling arguments on many sides of the issue. To dismiss the fact 
of reasonable pluralism is to retreat from our actual experience of our social 
and political world. 
Since Deweyans are committed to the idea that the worth of a 
philosophical view is to be judged according to the depth of its connection 
with real-life problems and conditions, I take the argument that Deweyan 
democracy cannot countenance the fact of reasonable pluralism to be 
especially damaging. The upshot of the argument I have deployed is that 
Deweyan democracy fails on its own terms; it must reject a salient trait of 
current experience. Consequently, pragmatists should bid farewell to Deweyan 
democracy. 
This is a disturbing result. Given the way in which Deweyan pragmatism 
conceives the relation between philosophy and politics, that it cannot supply a 
viable theory of democracy means that Deweyan pragmatism is a 
philosophical failure as such. When we add to this the consideration that 
neither Peirce nor James wrote systematically about political philosophy, the 
trouble deepens. Could it be that pragmatism can provide no sustainable 
political vision? If so, pragmatists have sufficient reason to abandon their 
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view and take up something new. My aim in the remainder of this paper is to 
provide a pragmatist alternative to Deweyan democracy, and thus to save 
pragmatist political theory from itself.  
 
 
3. A Peircean Alternative 
 
The very idea of a Peircean conception of democracy may seem strained. Yet, 
as I have argued elsewhere at length (Talisse 2003; 2007), Peirce’s essay on 
“The Fixation of Belief” is best read as ultimately promoting a social 
epistemology according to which norms of proper inquiry entail democratic 
political norms. The key to Peirce’s “Fixation” essay, I contend, is the thesis 
that there are norms internal to belief itself. Peirce holds that in order to assess 
oneself as believing that p, one must assess oneself as being properly responsive to 
the relevant evidence, arguments, and reasons. To recognize of oneself that one is 
in the habit of behaving as if p, but is not appropriately responsive to the 
relevant reasons, is to no longer be able to assess oneself as believing that p; 
rather, one must see one’s commitment to p as a kind of symptom, a strong 
indication of one’s lack of epistemic control. This is why the first three of the 
four methods of belief fixation that Peirce examines fail: they are 
unsustainable once one assesses oneself as following them. 
But let me change gears here. I do not want to invite controversy over 
textual interpretation. So let me state the argument quickly and in decidedly 
non-Peircean terms. 
There are two features of belief that are of special relevance to Peircean 
pragmatists. The first can be stated in a way owing to G. E. Moore (1942). He 
recognized that statements of a particular form, when understood as first-
personal epistemic assessments, have a certain paradoxical nature. To wit:  
(M) I believe that it’s raining, but it’s not. 
What is paradoxical about this statement is that although it may, of 
course be true of you, you can’t believe it to be true of you. That is, to assess as 
false a belief that you hold is (typically) to dissolve the belief. When we 
believe, we aim at truth. To show that a belief is false is (typically) to defeat 
the belief.  
The second feature of belief is the impossibility of what Bernard Williams 
calls “deciding to believe” (1976). I ask you to try to believe that I right now 
have exactly 27 dollars in my left pocket. Go ahead. Try. Notice what your 
trying consists in: you are trying to give yourself a reason for thinking that it 
is true that I have exactly 27 dollars in my pocket. That is, you are trying to 
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convince yourself that in believing that I have exactly 27 dollars in my 
pocket, you wouldd be appropriately responding to reasons. In short, when we 
believe, we aspire to be responsive to reasons. We cannot take ourselves to 
believe willy-nilly or at random. Of course, many of our beliefs are random. 
But the first-personal perspective is crucial: we do not assess ourselves in this 
way. And when we come to realize of a belief that it was derived willy-nilly, 
we (typically) see it as a clear symptom of epistemic failure; accordingly, we 
see fit to take epistemic action: we revise, or withdraw belief, or suspend 
judgment, or deceive, or confabulate. And so on. 
In short: when we believe, we aim to believe what is true. And the way we 
aim to believe what is true is by believing in a way that responds to our 
evidence and reasons. As epistemic agents, then, we are bound by two norms: 
truth and responsiveness. Now, a lot needs to be said here about famous 
(infamous?) results concerning the deep irrationality of human beings. I 
cannot take these up here. For now, let me state what makes this view of 
belief a pragmatist view: The norms of truth and responsiveness are internal to 
our practices of belief. They are not parachuted in from the lofty heights of 
some philosophical conception. They inhere in what we do, how we think, and 
how we communicate. More importantly, they specify what it takes to be 
epistemically above-board; they specify our epistemic commitments and form 
our conception of epistemic responsibility. 
An epistemic argument for democracy follows intuitively from this 
conception of epistemic agency. One should endorse a democratic political 
order because only in a democracy can one live up to one’s epistemic 
commitments. That is, if being a believer commits one to aspiring to truth, 
and if one aspires to truth by responding appropriately to reasons, then 
responsible believing calls us to the social enterprise of examining, 
exchanging, testing, and challenging reasons. It follows that one can satisfy 
one’s commitments qua believer only within a political context in which it is 
possible to be a free inquirer. Inquiry requires that characteristically 
democratic norms obtain; in order to inquire, there must be norms of equality, 
free speech, a freedom of information, open debate, protected dissent, access 
to decision-making institutions, and so on. Moreover, since the project of 
responsiveness involves testing one’s beliefs against the broadest possible pool 
of reasons, experiences, and considerations, inquiry requires more radically 
democratic norms, such as participation, inclusion, and recognition. 
Additionally, the Peircean argument carries a number of institutional 
entailments. If inquiry is to commence, the formal infrastructure of 
democracy must be in place, including a constitution, courts, accountable 
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bodies of representation, regular elections, and a free press. Also, there must 
be a system of public schooling designed to equip students in the epistemic 
habits necessary for inquiry, and institutions of distributive justice to 
eliminate as far as possible material obstructions to democratic citizenship. In 
addition, democracy might also require special provisions for the preservation 
of public spaces, the creation of forums for citizen deliberation, and the like.9 
Peircean democracy shares many features with the Deweyan view. To wit: 
Insofar as it begins from a view of what it is to believe and inquire properly, we 
can say that Peircean democracy is substantive. As it sees democratic politics 
as involving social processes of reason-exchanging, Peircean democracy is 
communicative. Given that it endorses social institutions that aim to enable 
proper inquiry among citizens, we can say that Peircean democracy is deep.  
However, there is a crucial difference between the two views. Whereas on 
the Deweyan view the democratic order is justified in terms of an overarching 
moral ideal, the Peircean view relies upon no substantive moral vision. The 
Peircean justifies democratic institutions and norms strictly in terms of a set 
of substantive epistemic commitments. It says that no matter what one believes 
about the good life, the meaning of human existence, or the value of 
community, one has reason to support a robust democratic political order of 
the sort described above simply in virtue of the fact that one holds beliefs. 
Since the Peircean conception of democracy does not contain a doctrine 
about “the one, ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity” (EW1:248), it can duly 
acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism. Peircean democrats can 
recognize that there are many distinct and epistemically responsible moral 
visions that are compatible with democratic politics. Accordingly, Peirceans 
understand that questions of how our schools, workplaces, and churches 
should be organized, what our communities should look like, and what 
constitutes good citizenship are not questions that can be settled by appealing 
to democratic theory as such; they are instead questions to be pursued 
experimentally and discursively within a democratic politics. What counts for 
Peirceans is not the proximity of a given democratic outcome to a substantive 
moral vision of the ideal society, but rather whether the outcome is the result 
of properly democratic processes of reason exchange. 
By drawing upon decidedly epistemic commitments, the Peircean view 
avoids the dilemma between substance and pluralism occasioned by Deweyan 
democracy. The Peircean pragmatist does not propose a moral ideal for all of 
                                                 
9 I’m thinking here of the kinds of policies endorsed by Cass Sunstein to ensure deliberation 
among persons of different opinions; see Sunstein 1996; 2001; 2003. See also Ackerman and 
Fishkin 2004.  
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society, but rather an analysis of proper epistemic practice. The Peircean then 
recommends a political order in which disputes between conflicting moral 
visions can be conducted in an epistemically responsible way. Hence the 
Peircean pragmatist offers a far more modest politics than the Deweyan. 
Whereas Dewey thought that getting democracy right meant getting the 
whole of moral philosophy right, the Peircean leaves open the dialectical space 
for substantive disagreements about deep moral and social questions within 
democracy. In this way, Peircean democracy is substantive and deep, but not 
hostile to the pluralism of substantive moral doctrines.  
Someone might object to the distinction I have invoked between moral and 
epistemic commitments. The objection has it that just as Deweyans expect 
everyone to converge upon a common substantive moral vision, Peirceans 
expect everyone to adopt a single (pragmatist) epistemology. The objection 
continues that Peircean epistemology is at least as controversial as any moral 
philosophy; and so both the Deweyan and the Peircean views commit the 
same error of denying reasonable pluralism. Deweyan democracy denies it at 
the level of moral commitments, and Peircean democracy denies it at the level 
of epistemic commitments. 
This objection is mistaken. The epistemic commitments that lie at the core 
of Peircean democracy do not constitute a comprehensive epistemology in 
their own right, but rather state a set of principles that are consistent with 
any well-developed epistemology. Internalists, externalists, foundationalists, 
coherentists, and so on all agree that beliefs aim at truth, and that when we 
believe, we take ourselves to be responding to reasons, argument, and 
evidence. Accordingly, the four Peircean commitments identified above 
represent an attempt to make explicit the epistemology that is implicit in our 
existing epistemic practice. They are the commitments we have in virtue of 
the very fact that we are believers; they are not optional. Furthermore, since 
contestation itself presupposes norms of reason-responsiveness and truth-
aiming, the Peircean commitments are not reasonably contestable. 
Peirceans and Deweyans are therefore not in the same boat. The 
substantive moral ideal that drives the Deweyan program is, indeed, 
reasonably rejectable; hence Deweyan democracy runs afoul of pluralism. This 
in turn jeopardizes the whole of Deweyan pragmatism. The Peircean epistemic 
commitments, by contrast, are robust enough to support a case for democratic 
politics, but are nonetheless modest enough to recognize the legitimacy of 
deep disputes over fundamental moral ideas. Hence the Peircean can offer 
what the Deweyan cannot, namely, a substantive conception of democracy 
that is consistent with a due appreciation of reasonable pluralism.  




4. A Recent Critic Considered 
 
My arguments against Deweyan democracy and in favor of Peircean 
democracy have generated a good deal of criticism. My critics fall roughly into 
two categories: those who seek simply to correct my understanding of 
Deweyan democracy, and those who object to my Peircean proposal. Many 
critics of the former sort tend unwittingly to present a conception of Deweyan 
democracy that renders it even more subject to reasonable rejection than the 
view I present as Deweyan democracy; they thereby confirm my criticism. 
Other critics of the former sort contend that my argument is question-begging 
because it appeals to a “foreign standard” (Ralston 2008: 630) in evaluating 
Deweyan democracy. I find this line of response unpromising since it seems 
committed to the view that all valid criticism is internal criticism; yet, of all 
philosophical schools, pragmatism is perhaps most vehemently committed to 
the claim that criticism can come from anywhere, and should be actively 
sought out, especially from those who do not share one’s fundamental 
commitments. As I said above, the criticism of Deweyan democracy draws 
upon a salient feature of experience, not the standards of some foreign 
philosophical program. In any case, I would like to conclude this paper by 
considering an objection that falls into the latter category of criticism. 
In a recent paper on “Pragmatism, Inquiry, and Political Liberalism”,” 
Matthew Festenstein (2010) argues that Peircean democracy “presupposes a 
specific moral epistemology” which like other “religious, moral and 
philosophical views” should be “discounted by political liberalism as bases for 
the use of state power” (2010: 38). Festenstein correctly anticipates my reply 
that since the epistemic norms in question are both internal to belief and first-
personal, the norms are not reasonably rejectable. Here is another way to put 
the point: There is no reasonable pluralism with respect to the epistemic 
norms upon which the Peircean view is based; therefore those norms may be 
appealed to in political justification. 
Festenstein suspects that the Peircean epistemic norms are indeed 
reasonably rejectable. Festenstein correctly attributes to me the view that to 
reasonably reject a claim is to reject it for reasons rather than simply 
dismissing or ridiculing it. I claim, then, that the very idea that coercion must 
be justified by means of reasons that are not reasonably rejectable embeds a 
commitment to the norm of reason-responsiveness; hence that norm is not 
reasonably rejectable. Festenstein sees an ambiguity, however, in the norm of 
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reason-responsiveness. He holds that one might reject p for a reason but yet 
fail to reject p for a reason that is responsive to others’ reasons. Festeinsten 
claims that I am committed to the view that to be reason-responsive is to be 
responsive to others’ reasons. He argues that this is a “question-begging” 
conception of reason-responsiveness, and surely one that could be rejected for 
reasons. 
But here is where the first-personal component of the Peircean view is 
crucial. Although it is possible for one to believe that p on the basis of reasons 
that do not respond to the reasons of others, it is not clear that it is possible to 
assess one’s belief that p as being epistemically proper once one recognizes 
that one’s reasons are non-responsive. Consider these self-assessments: 
(a)  I believe that p, but I am unaware of what competent opponents say 
about p. 
 
(b) I believe that p, but whenever I state my reasons for p, otherwise 
intelligent, sincere, and competent people are unmoved. 
 
(c) I believe that p, but I always lose fairly-conducted argumentative 
exchanges with competent interlocutors who reject p. 
 
Again, such assessments are consistent with maintaining the belief that p. 
Indeed, it is easy to find cases in which someone believes that p despite having 
no idea what competent opponents say; and it may be easier to find cases in 
which belief that p seems to strengthen in the face of a lost argument. But 
uninformed and tenacious believers most frequently accompany their beliefs 
with stories designed to dismiss or malign those who disagree. That is, no one 
takes himself to be a tenacious or uninformed believer; rather, when we 
believe, we take ourselves to be responding not only to the reasons that move 
us, but also to the reasons of those who believe otherwise. 
Festenstein finds this kind of reply unconvincing. He holds that it is 
possible to believe that p and yet not take oneself to responding to reasons. To 
make the case, he considers a fundamentalist who simply defers to a religious 
authority. He imagines someone who “takes her preferred source of 
instruction to be authoritative, but her doing so is not necessarily on the basis 
of the reasons [. . .] presented in support of this epistemic authority”; 
Festenstein adds, “She may simply accept that this source is authoritative” 
(2010: 39).  
I confess that I’m not sure what Festenstein is proposing. Does the 
fundamentalist accept that her guru is epistemically authoritative for reasons 
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other than those that are offered in support of that authority? Does the 
fundemantalist hold that the guru is authoritative, but not epistemically so? 
Has the question of source and nature of the guru’s authority simply not 
occurred to her? It seems to me that these questions matter. And here are two 
other crucial questions: Does she believe that the reasons explicitly offered in 
support of the guru’s epistemic authority fail? Does she believe that the 
pronouncements of her guru are false? 
So it is hard to know what to make of the case. But it is important to 
notice that Festenstein has moved from first-personal to third-personal 
assessments. It seems to me easy to invent cases involving caricatured 
fundamentalists and other figures supposedly at the epistemic margins. But 
the fact is that fundamentalists most frequently take themselves to believe for 
reasons; indeed, they’re often very eager to produce their reasons. In any case, 
Festenstein’s appeal to the fundamentalist instantiates a trend among those 
who object to the fixation view, namely, that of providing examples of other 
people who believe without taking themselves to have reasons. I contend that 
such cases are rare, and those who fit the description are plausibly regarded as 
in the grip of some kind of psychosis. So I wonder if Festenstein is willing to 
cite a belief that he holds but does not take himself to have reason to hold. In 
the meantime, it seems to me that Peircean democracy survives Festenstein’s 
critique. 
To conclude: Drawing on Rawlsian insights, I have sketched an argument 
against Dewey democracy. As I mentioned, I consider this a pragmatic 
argument, one which Deweyans ignore at the cost of rendering their view 
impotent to address salient features of contemporary political experience and 
thus irrelevant. It seems to me that any attempt to repair Deweyan 
democracy will require a rejection of significant features of the view; in order 
to make Deweyan democracy consistent with the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
one must omit Dewey’s appeals to shared experience, the Great Community, 
and much else that is distinctively Deweyan about the view. I have suggested 
in this paper that there is another way forward for the pragmatist: Peircean 
democracy. Admittedly, I have here only sketched the view, and much more 
needs to be said about the Peircean alternative. The filling out of the view is a 
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